In this paper we consider a scenario in which the monetary authority provides an explicit inflation target in order to anchor private sector expectations and align them with policy objectives. In this context, a biased perception of the target may arise due to imperfect information flows and idiosyncrasies in information processing lead to heterogenous beliefs about the target. We allow private sector expectations to be revised over time as new information becomes available and the direction of change is determined by the distance between agents' beliefs and actual realizations of macro variables. The recursive choice between alternative predictors is modeled as an optimization problem under rational inattention. Within this framework we investigate whether a simple interest rate rule can steer the economy toward the targeted equilibrium. Our findings suggest that standard policy advices, i.e., ensure determinacy under rational expectations, may not be sufficient to reach the target. Instead, a sound monetary policy should be fine-tuned to ensure that the signal sent by realizations of macro variables can correct biased agents' beliefs. JEL codes: E52, D83, D84, C62. 1 Modern monetary policy has emphasized that maintaining a stable monetary environments depends crucially on the ability of the policy regime to control inflation expectations. Woodford (2003) defines the activity of modern central banks (CB hereafter) as management of expectations. A consequence of the importance of managing expectations is that a transparent CB decision-making process is highly desirable. Policy decisions should be transparent in order to reduce or eliminate informational asymmetries between the CB and the private sector, and therefore improve the effectiveness of monetary policy. Transparency of CB decision-making has increased rapidly with the adoption of inflation targeting starting in the early nineties with the CBs of New Zealand, Canada, the U.K. and Sweden. 1 Policy makers develop communication strategies that aim explicitly to align expectations with their own policy objectives. The provision of an explicit numerical inflation target aimed at providing a focal point for private sector expectations is an example of such communication strategies. As argued by Svensson (2009) and Blinder, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, De Haan, and Jansen (2008), in an ideal world characterized by symmetric information between the CB and the rest of the economy and a fully informed private sector holding rational expectations, there is no specific role for CB communication. However, the importance that the debate on CB transparency and communication has assumed in recent years demonstrates that both theorists and policy makers are concerned with deviations from such ideal world. A significant strand of the literature originated from the seminal work of Morris and Shin (2002) considers imperfect knowledge of monetary policy within the private sector and analyses the issue of optimal degree of transparency in the context of global games with public and private noisy signals (see e.g., Cornand and Heinemann (2008), Cornand and Baeriswyl (2010), and Walsh (2007) among others). Another line of research relaxes the assumption of rational expectations and considers CB transparency and communications issues within the context of a New 1 See Geraats (2002) for a survey of recent literature on CB transparency. 2 Keynesian framework with adaptive learning (see e.g., Orphanides and Williams (2005), Berardi and Duffy (2007), and Eusepi and Preston (2010) among others).
produces good forecasts, or in other words, if the monetary policy rule implemented by the CB keeps inflation close enough to the target, the probability that agents will rely on the true target will be high and dynamics will converge to the intended equilibrium. If, on the other hand, the true inflation target does not produce good forecasts, agents will adopt different predictors, causing the economy to move away from the targeted equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework featuring recursive inattentiveness and heterogeneous biased beliefs in the presence of CB's inflation targeting. Section 3 derives policy results about inflation target stability. Section 4 contains concluding remarks.
The model
This section develops a New Keynesian (NK hereafter) environment extended to include possible biases in the perceived inflation targets and the dynamics of such beliefs.
An NK economy with biased inflation target beliefs
We consider a NK DSGE model as in Woodford (2003) or Galí (2008) . The demand side of the economy is composed by a continuum of households maximizing the expected present value of discounted utility subject to their budget constraint. On the supply side, a continuum of firms produces differentiated consumption goods under monopolistic competition and a staggered price setting mechanism with probability ω as in Calvo (1983) . We assume that firms are owned by households and maximize expected profits given the production function and the households' demand.
The equations describing the demand and the supply side of the economy are the standard dynamic IS equation and the New Keynesian Phillips Curve:
(2.1) π t = ky t + βE t π t+1 .
(2.
2)
The Central Bank (CB) in the model targets a level of inflationπ via the following interest rate rule:
i t =π + φ π (π t −π) .
(2.3)
In the remainder we will assume that the CB has a zero-inflation target, i.e.,π = 0, so that equation (2.3) reduces to
(2.4)
Although the CB announces the target in order to anchor private sector expectations, we consider a scenario in which a biased perception of the target may arise due to imperfect information flows. Such imperfections may be related to transparency issues or inaccurate information processing. The inaccuracy in the perception of the inflation target in the model generates a potential source of macroeconomic instability related to the lack of coordination among individuals, who then hold heterogeneous beliefs about the target. In particular, following Salle, Yildizoglu, and Sénégas (2013) we assume that the inflation target perceived by agent i,π p i , and the true inflation target are related via the relationshipπ p i =π + ν i , where ν i represents a noise term. Agents in the model then use their perceived target to forecast future inflation. As for the expectations on the output gap, we assume that agents, given their perceived inflation target, form their beliefs about the output gap consistently with the structural equations of the canonical NK model, namely Eqs. (2.1) -(2.2). Consequently, given a certain beliefπ p i about inflation, the correspondent belief about the output gap is (1 − β)π p i /k.
In the presence of idiosyncrasies in the perception of the inflation target, the standard NK framework should be extended to accommodate for heterogeneous beliefs. Following Kurz (2011) it is possible to aggregate the first order conditions of the agents, derived under subjective expectations, in order to obtain structural equations consistent with heterogeneous beliefs of the form 2 y t =Ē t y t+1 − σ −1 (i t −Ē t π t+1 ) + ζ t (2.5) π t = ky t + βĒ t π t+1 + ξ t , (2.6) whereĒ = i E i denotes the average expectation across agents indexed by i, ζ t is defined as ζ t ≡ i (E i,t c i,t+1 − E i,t c t+1 ) and denotes the deviations of average agents' forecasts of individual future consumption from average forecast of aggregate consumption, and ξ t is defined as ξ t ≡ (1 − ω)β i (E i,t p i,t+1 − E i,t p t+1 ) and represents deviations of average agents' forecasts of individual prices from average forecast of aggregate price.
Eqs. (2.5) -(2.6) show that, in the presence of heterogeneous beliefs, aggregate dynamics depend on average forecasts of output and inflation, and on the additional terms ζ t and ξ t . In what follows we will consider ζ t and ξ t as i.i.d. disturbance terms and analyse the dynamics of the deterministic skeleton of the model composed by y t =Ē t y t+1 − σ −1 (i t −Ē t π t+1 ) (2.7)
π t = ky t + βĒ t π t+1 .
(2.8)
We make this assumption in order to keep the model analytically tractable and derive results about global stability, and we remark that this is the standard approach followed in the literature on monetary policy with diverse beliefs (see, e.g., Brazier, Harrison, King, and Yates (2008) Finally, we also note that the model described by Eqs. (2.7) -(2.8) corresponds to the model derived in Branch and McGough (2009) under specific assumption on the expectation operators of the agents in the economy.
Belief dynamics
As a result of imperfect information flows, agents in our model hold heterogeneous beliefs. We allow for individual expectations to change over time and we introduce discipline in the individual selection of the forecasting rule for inflation (and the implied rule for the output gap) by subjecting the choice of the forecasting heuristic to a fitness criterion.
In what follows we will consider a discrete support for the noise term ν i linking true and perceived inflation target, implying a finite number of biased beliefs. A finite number of forecasting rules seems reasonable, as boundedly rational agents may exhibit digit preference and restrict their predictions, for example, to values in integer numbers or to half percentages. 3 We will relax this assumption in Section 3.2 and allow for the possibility of a continuum of biased beliefs.
We define the probability of choosing a certain predictor h from a set of H predictors conditional on the set of fitness measures U = (U 1 , ..., U H ) as
(2.9)
The multinomial logit expression described in Eq. (2.9) can be derived directly from a random utility model (see Manski and McFadden (1981) and Brock and Hommes (1997) ) in which agents observe the performance of each rule h with some noise
where h,i represent an idiosyncratic error term. Assuming that the noise term h,i is drawn from a double exponential distribution, as the number of agents goes to infinity, the probability of agents choosing predictor h, is given by the multinomial logit formula in Eq. (2.9). The parameter δ is referred to as intensity of choice and it is inversely related to the variance of the noise term in Eq. (2.10). The intensity of choice reflects the sensitivity of the mass of agents to selecting the optimal prediction strategy according to the fitness measure. The case δ = 0 corresponds to the case of infinite variance in which differences in fitness can not be observed and all probabilities are constant and equal to 1/H, where H is the total number of available predictors. The case δ = ∞ corresponds to the case in which the deterministic part of the fitness can be perfectly observed and in every period all agents choose the best predictor.
Alternatively, Eq. (2.9) can be derived within a framework in which the choice between the predictor for future inflation, linked to the target announced by the CB, is modeled as an optimization problem under rational inattention. The notion of rational inattention as described by Sims (2003) implies that the true value of the options available to the agents can be investigated, but due to the agents' limited information processing capacity, it is too costly to know them with certainty.
Therefore the performance of each option h, measured by U h , is observed imprecisely, implying noise in the decision process and resulting in probabilistic choices of the agents. Agents do not know a priori which predictor will be more attractive in a certain period, so their prior probabilities of choosing each predictor, without processing any information, are symmetric and equal to 1/H. Therefore we can apply the framework developed in Matějka and McKay (2011) to derive the probabilistic choice between predictors as the outcome of an optimization problem under rational inattention with discrete and symmetric options. 4 Under rational inattention, agents cannot fully observe the true values of U = (U 1 , ..., U H ), and they have some prior knowledge on the predictor attractiveness given by the joint pdf g(U ). Agents receive signals on the choices h, and I(U ; h) denotes the mutual information defined as the reduction in the entropy of U due to the information contained in the signal for option h. We assume that the agents' information processing capacity is limited by the exogenously given parameter s. Under rational inattention the optimization problem faced by the agents reads as follows:
where the last constraint imposes consistency between the conditional posteriors and the priors. In other words, agents choose the conditional posteriors {f (U |h)} H h=1 in order to maximize the expected value of the predictor attractiveness U subject to the information processing constraint. From the first order conditions of problem (2.11) -(2.13), the probability of choosing the predictor h, given a set of values in U , is then given by 5
where v is the Lagrange multiplier on the information constraint and can be interpreted as the shadow cost of information. The intensity of choice δ is inversely related to the shadow cost of information v. When v = 0 (δ = ∞) agents always choose the best predictor, while as v rises the information cost on forecast attractiveness increases, and when v = ∞ (δ = 0) agents only decide on the basis of their priors 1/H.
Given that agents can switch between forecasts in each period, they solve the static predictor selection problem in each period and therefore, the probability, in period t, of choosing a prediction strategy h for inflation and the output gap is given by
(2.14)
In the light of the aforementioned empirical evidence for the evolution of forecasting strategies in reaction to past forecast errors in both survey and experimental data, we assume that the attractiveness of each predictor is negatively affected by past squared forecast errors. This fitness metric is also common in the theoretical literature (see, e.g., De Grauwe (2012), Branch and McGough (2010) , and Anufriev, Assenza, Hommes, and Massaro (2013) among others). The attractiveness of predictor h at the beginning of period t is defined as: 
The full model under scrutiny is described by the follow-ing system of equations 
Few biased beliefs
We follow Anufriev, Assenza, Hommes, and Massaro (2013) and start with the simplest possible case in which there are only three types of beliefs. In particular, we will assume that agents may overestimate the target by an amount b π , underestimate the target by an amount −b π , or have correct beliefs about the target.
This simplifying assumption will enable us to derive analytical results about global stability and build the intuition for possible dynamics in the case of many, possibly a continuum of, belief types considered in Section 3.2. The set of predictors is then composed by the pairs 6 6 In this example we assume "symmetric" beliefs, in the sense that positive and negative biases are exactly balanced around the targeted equilibrium. The main reason is that under this assumption the target is among the equilibria of the system and this allows us to address questions about its stability. However we remark that symmetry of beliefs is not essential for predictor 1: E 1,t π t+1 = 0,
Substituting the specified forecasting rules into system (2.16), we get
Let us define m t = n 2,t − n 3,t = z(y t−1 , π t−1 ), with z(y t−1 , π t−1 ) being described by 
. Substituting then (3.2) into (3.1b) we get
where Γ ≡ k+σ σ+kφπ . In this way we can define the map T composed by (3.2) -(3.3) as:
(3.4) many qualitative features of the bifurcation scenario.
From the Jacobian matrix J of T , given by
it is straightforward to see that det J(y, π) = 0. Thus, in any point of the phase space, one eigenvalue is equal to zero. From this consideration it follows that there ought to exist a one-dimensional invariant plane on which dynamics take place.
We can indeed state the following
Therefore, the dynamics of (3.4) are described by the restriction of the map T to the invariant line, that is the following 1D map 7
5)
in terms of the variable m t , which is easier to handle analytically. By characterising the dynamics for m t we can pin down the dynamics of y t and π t via (3.2) -(3.3).
The map f δ is monotonic, 8 bounded and symmetric with respect to the point m = 0, which implies that the map always owns the steady state m * = 0 corresponding to the targeted equilibrium (see Appendix C). However, the steady state targeted by the CB, corresponding to m * = 0 in terms of the dynamics described in Eq. (3.5), may not be globally or even locally stable. Dynamics may converge to other non-fundamental steady states denoted by m + > 0 and m − = −m + < 0.
In what follows we provide a complete analysis of the global dynamics of (3.5) and
show how they depend on the parameters of interest, namely the intensity of choice δ and the monetary policy reaction coefficient φ π .
7 The expressions for M and N are derived in Appendix A. 8 The monotonic intervals of f δ are solely determined by the sign of N as shown in Appendix C.
model, and introduce the positive constants
We will now identify different monetary policy regimes on the basis of the strength of the monetary policy reaction coefficient φ π . When φ π < φ w π we define the monetary policy regime as weak ; when φ w π < φ π < φ m π the monetary policy regime is defined as moderate; when φ m π < φ π < φ a π monetary policy is defined as aggressive; when φ a π < φ π < φ o π we label the policy regime as very aggressive; finally, when φ π > φ o π we refer to the implemented policy as overreacting. Table 1 summarises the monetary policy regimes. Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) calibration, the threshold values for the different monetary policy regimes are: φ w π = 0.8661, φ m π = 1.9710, φ a π = 6.2877 and φ o π = 14.8762. 9 The corresponding dynamics are described respectively in Propositions 3.2 -3.6.
Weak monetary policy Proposition 3.2. Let φ π < φ w π ("weak policy"). Then values 0 < δ * 1 ≤ δ * 2 exist such that
• for δ < δ * 1 the target steady state is unique and globally stable;
• for δ * 1 < δ < δ * 2 three steady states exist, the unstable target steady state m * , and two other stable non-fundamental steady states, m + and m − ;
9 Numerical values of monetary policy thresholds vary according to the preferred calibration. For example, using Woodford (1999) calibration leads to the following policy thresholds: φ w π = 0.9617, φ m π = 1.2490, φ a π = 1.7997 and φ o π = 2.1562. However, the specific values of the thresholds do not alter the qualitative results of the analysis. m + and m − ) and two other steady states are unstable.
Proof. See Appendix C. Figure 1 shows the map f δ under a weak monetary policy regime (φ π = 0.5) for low, medium, and high values of the the parameter δ. 10 When δ is relatively low, the target steady state, corresponding to m * = 0, is unique and globally stable. The intuition for this result is the following. When the shadow cost of information is prohibitively high, i.e., δ is low, agents decide mostly on the basis of their priors, meaning that they are more or less evenly distributed among the different predictors. Therefore, due to the symmetry of beliefs around the target, realized inflation and output will remain relatively close to the target equilibrium and dynamics will converge. As δ increases, two stable non-fundamental steady states are created, m+ > 0 and m − < 0, while the target equilibrium m * = 0 loses stability for intermediate values of δ, to become locally stable again for high values of δ, where two additional unstable steady states are created in a pitchfork bifurcation. The intuition for the existence of stable non-fundamental steady states for high values of δ is simple (cf. Proposition C.2 in Appendix C). Suppose that realizations of inflation and output gap are close to some biased beliefs. When the cost of information is low, i.e., intensity of choice is high, almost all agents will adopt the biased predictor, which is the best performing predictor in terms of forecast error. If the monetary policy reaction is weak, the signal sent by realizations of aggregate variables is not strong enough to "correct" agents' beliefs and dynamics may lock into non-fundamental equilibria.
Moderate monetary policy Proposition 3.3. Let φ w π < φ π < φ m π ("moderate policy"). Then values 0 < δ * 1 ≤ δ * 2 exist such that Parameter values are φ π = 0.5 and b π = 0.25.
• for δ > δ * 2 five steady states exist, three steady states (m * , m + and m − ) are locally stable and two other steady states are unstable.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Dynamics under a moderate monetary policy are shown in Figure 2 for low, medium and high values of δ. The monetary policy reaction coefficient is set to φ π = 1.5, a value typically suggested in the literature (see, e.g., Taylor (1993) ). As before, a decrease in the shadow cost of information, i.e., higher δ, leads to the creation of stable non-fundamental steady states. The difference from the previous case is that the target equilibrium does not lose local stability. Therefore, an interest rate rule that reacts more than point to point to deviations of inflation from the target, leads to convergence to the fundamental equilibrium if the economy is sufficiently close to the target. However, the Taylor principle (i.e., φ π > 1) alone is not sufficient to ensure convergence to the target. In fact, even if the target equilibrium is determinate under rational expectations, the presence of misperception of the CB target coupled with recursive evaluation of forecasting heuristics may lead to convergence to non-fundamental equilibria. As before, the existence of multiple stable equilibria is due to the fact that monetary policy is not strong enough, even if the Taylor principle is satisfied, to correct wrong beliefs of agents about the target. Aggressive monetary policy Proposition 3.4. Let φ m π < φ π < φ a π ("aggressive policy"). Then the target steady state is unique and globally stable for any δ.
When the nominal interest rate reacts aggressively to inflation, the CB avoids multiplicity of equilibria and the target equilibrium is globally stable. Adjustment dynamics differ according to whether the slope of the map is positive or negative, i.e., whether φ m π < φ π < φ * π or φ * π < φ π < φ a π . 11 Figure 3 depicts the map (3.5)
for different values of δ and φ π = 2 in the case of positive slope. The aggressive monetary policy regime of the CB reacts to deviations from the target in such a way that the fundamental equilibrium is closest to realizations of aggregate variables and ongoing evaluations of forecasting rule lead more and more agents to believe in the true value of the target. Therefore, a properly designed monetary policy leads to uniqueness and global stability of the target steady state even in the presence of biased beliefs about the true target.
Very aggressive monetary policy Proposition 3.5. Let φ a π < φ π < φ o π ("very aggressive policy"). Then a value δ * 1 > 0 exists such that • for δ < δ * 1 the target steady state is unique and globally stable;
• for δ > δ * 1 the locally stable target steady state and a stable 2-cycle coexist, separated by an unstable 2-cycle.
In this scenario macroeconomic variables follow an oscillatory path that can lead to convergence to the target equilibrium or to a stable 2-cycle. In fact, Figure   4 shows the creation of two stable non-fundamental steady state for the second iterate of map f δ for high values of δ. The reason for this result is due to the strong negative effect of real interest rate on output, acting as a stabilizing force.
Suppose that a positive cost-push shock hits the economy. Higher inflation causes the CB to raise the real interest rate which in turns lowers demand which reduces future inflation. However, if the reaction of the CB is too strong, the decrease in demand in the face of higher real rates will be high enough to push the economy out of the basin of attraction of the target steady state, and the system will lock in a stable 2-cycle. The reason is that when φ π is relatively high, there will be a consistent decrease in output after, say a positive shock to inflation, and this will have a positive impact on the performance of the negative bias predictor causing more and more agents to adopt that predictor. If the intensity of choice δ is relatively low, agents do not respond fast to differences in predictors' performances and dynamics will slowly converge to the target equilibrium. However, when δ is higher, even small differences in predictors' performances may lead agents to switch massively among forecasting rules. These alternate waves of "optimism"
and "pessimism" lead the system to a stable 2-cycle. Overreacting monetary policy Proposition 3.6. Let φ π > φ o π ("overreacting policy"). Then values 0 < δ * 1 < δ * 2 exist such that
• for δ * 1 < δ < δ * 2 the unstable target steady state and a stable 2-cycle coexist;
• for δ > δ * 2 the locally stable target steady state and a stable 2-cycle coexist, separated by an unstable 2-cycle.
Dynamics under an overreacting monetary policy are described in Figure 5 
Many biased beliefs
In Section 3.1 we considered the simplest possible scenario in which information imperfections and individual idiosyncrasies gave rise to three different types of beliefs, corresponding to underestimation, overestimation and correct guess of the target. This example enabled us to derive analytical results and build the intuition for possible dynamics as a function of the key parameters δ, related to the cost of information, and φ π , measuring the strength of monetary policy.
A similar analysis can be made for other examples with a larger number of heterogeneous beliefs resulting from imperfect information. Figure 6 shows the bifurcation diagram in the presence of five different beliefs, namely {−b π , −b π /2, 0, b π /2, b π }, For high values of δ, additional steady states are created. The intuition is similar to the case of three beliefs. If the intensity of choice is high enough, more and more agents will adopt the belief yielding the most precise forecast, causing dynamics to lock into a self-fulfilling non-fundamental equilibrium.
In this section we want to revisit our main policy question, i.e, whether a simple interest rate rule can implement the inflation level targeted by the CB in the presence of biased perceptions and recursive evaluation of beliefs, when the number of beliefs H is arbitrarily large. In general, it is difficult to obtain analytical results for systems with many belief types. We will therefore resort to the large type limit concept (LTL henceforth) introduced in Brock, Hommes, and Wagener 
, where we divided both numerators and denominators by H. The LTL is obtained by replacing the sample mean with the population mean, yieldinḡ
As shown in Brock, Hommes, and Wagener (2005) , when the number of beliefs H is sufficiently large the LTL dynamics well approximate the dynamics of the system with H beliefs. In particular, when H is large, with high probability the steady states and their local stability conditions coincide for both the LTL and the H-beliefs map. Hence, properties of the dynamical system with many types of beliefs can be studied using the LTL system. reduce tō E t y t+1 = δ2s 2 1 + δ2s 2 (1 + a 2 ) a(π t−1 + ay t−1 ) (3.7a) E t π t+1 = δ2s 2 1 + δ2s 2 (1 + a 2 ) (π t−1 + ay t−1 ) .
(3.7b)
Using results (3.7a) -(3.7b), we can rewrite system (2.16) as
where Λ and Γ are defined as before (see Appendix A) and
Dynamics in the presence of a continuum of beliefs are described in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.7. Consider the LTL dynamics described by linear system (3.8).
1. Let φ π < 1. Then a value δ * exists such that:
• for δ < δ * the target steady state is unique and globally stable;
• for δ > δ * the target steady state is unstable.
2. Let φ π > 1. Under certain restrictions on structural parameters, 13 a value φ * * π exists such that:
(2a) for φ π < φ * * π the target steady state is unique and globally stable for any δ;
(2b) for φ π > φ * * π , a value δ * * exists such that:
• for δ < δ * * the target steady state is unique and globally stable;
• for δ > δ * * the target steady state is unstable.
The general policy implications of agents' biased perception of the target and recursive evaluation of beliefs derived in the case of few biased perceptions carry over to the case of an arbitrarily large number of heterogeneous beliefs. In particular, when the shadow cost of information is prohibitively high, the target steady state is globally stable. The intuition for this result is the same as in the case with few biased beliefs laid out in Section 3.1. When the coefficient φ π < 1, the monetary policy reaction to inflation is not strong enough to offset deviations of inflation from the target, leading to system instability. Once again, the Taylor principle, i.e., φ π > 1, is not a sufficient condition to guarantee convergence to the target. In fact, as in the case of few biased beliefs, monetary policy may overreact to deviations of inflation from the target, causing oscillatory dynamics moving away from the target.
Conclusions
This paper discusses the issue of inflation target implementability via simple instrument rules. In particular, we consider a scenario in which the CB announces the target to anchor private sector expectations, but biased perceptions of the target arise due to imperfect information.
Recursive evaluation of beliefs as new information becomes available leads to a dynamical system in which aggregate variables and private sector's expectations co-evolve over time. The specific form of beliefs dynamics can be derived alternatively from a random utility model in which agents observe the distance between predictions and realizations with some noise, or from an optimization problem under rational inattention, in which agents face an information processing capacity constraint. Both frameworks link the probability of agents' holding a certain belief to the performance of such belief in terms of forecasting error, via a multinomial logit model. Within this environment, we investigate whether the monetary authority can effectively manage private sector expectations via an interest rate rule, and lead the economy to the desired target.
Our results suggest that the CB's ability to implement the inflation target depends crucially upon the interplay between the strength of monetary policy reaction to inflation, and the key parameter regulating the evolution of beliefs over time.
The latter is related to the noise with which agents observe predictors' performances within the random utility framework, or to the shadow cost of information within the rational inattention environment.
At first we analyse the simplest possible scenario in which information imperfections give raise to only few biased beliefs. This allows us to derive analytical results about global stability and build the intuition for the resulting dynamics.
We then consider a more general scenario in which an arbitrarily large number of biased perceptions may arise as a consequence of imperfect information flows.
We find that, when the cost of information is not prohibitively high, the monetary authority should react aggressively to deviations of inflation from the target.
However, merely obeying to the Taylor principle, i.e., setting the interest rate to ensure determinacy, may not be sufficient to achieve the target. In fact, if the policy rule overreacts to inflation, recursive evaluation of beliefs may prevent convergence to the desired equilibrium. Instead, monetary policy should be fine-tuned in order to ensure that the signal sent by realizations of aggregate variables can correct wrong agents' beliefs. Indeed, our findings suggests that properly designed monetary policies lead to convergence to the target steady state and are robust to different levels of the shadow cost of information.
Appendix

A Reduction to 1D map
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Points on the straight line y = Λ Γ π are given by the (parametric) representation:
T :
, and Γ ≡ k+σ σ+kφπ . Recall the definition m t = z(y t−1 , π t−1 ). From P = (b π Λm, b π Γm) ∈ S and ap-
The trajectories starting in S belong to it forever, while any point not belonging to S is mapped into S in one iteration.
B Monetary policy thresholds
Define the function q (φ π ) = M N . Given the theoretical restriction 0 < β < 1, the function q (φ π ) has the following properties:
. Let us introduce two positive quantities φ w π and φ o π defined by the solution of equation x * − 1 = |q (φ π )| where x * ≈ 1.46306 is the solution of 2 + e x − xe x = 0 (see Lemma 1 in Appendix C), and other two positive quantities φ m π and φ a π defined by the solution of the equation 1 = |q (φ π )|. Given the
together with the critical values of φ w π , φ m π , φ a π , φ o π , are shown in Figure 7 using the Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) (CGG) calibration. Given the calibrated values for the structural parameters, the threshold values for the different monetary policy regimes are:
φ w π = 0.8661, φ m π = 1.9710, φ a π = 6.2877 and φ o π = 14.8762. Figure 7 : Function q (φ π ), CGG calibration.
C Dynamics of the model with few biased beliefs
In order to analyse the dynamics of the model with few biased beliefs we follow the strategy laid out in Anufriev, Assenza, Hommes, and Massaro (2013) . The slope of the map in (3.5) is given by values that satisfy N = N (φ π ) > 0, i.e.
Since all coefficients are positive, we find a threshold value for φ π
We can distinguish two cases, namely φ π < φ * π , implying that f δ (m) is increasing, and φ π > φ * π implying that f δ (m) is decreasing. Using the CGG calibration, the threshold value such that N = 0 is φ * π = 3.5059.
Moreover, the function f δ (m) has the following properties:
• f maps the interval [−1, 1] into itself;
• f is bounded;
The monotonicity of f ensures that, when φ π < φ * π , from the minimum value f (−1) it follows that f (−1) ≥ −1 and from the maximum value f (1) it follows that f (1) ≤ 1.
Since function f δ (m) is bounded (either from below or above), no diverging trajectories are possible. Indeed m expresses the difference between fractions and it can assume only value in the interval [−1, 1].
The following lemmas are useful to prove the results described in Proposition 3.2.
Lemma 1. Equation 2 + e x − xe x = 0 has a unique solution x * ∈ (1, 2) . For x < x * we have 2 + e x − xe x > 0 and for x > x * we have 2 + e x − xe x < 0.
Proof. Consider the function g(x) = 2 + e x − xe x . Notice that lim x→−∞ g(x) = 2, lim x→∞ g(x) = −∞, g(0) = 3, and that derivative g (x) = −xe x . Hence, for x ≤ 0 function g increases from 2 to 3 and has no zeros. For x > 0 function g is strictly decreasing and has at most one zero. On the other hand, g(1) = 2 > 0, while g(2) = 2 − e 2 < 0, because e x > 1 + x for x = 2 becomes e 2 > 3. Applying the intermediate value theorem we obtain that there exists x * , zero of function g, and that x * ∈ (1, 2). The following result provides conditions for local stability of the inflation target of the CB for the case in which the map f δ is increasing, i.e., when φ π < φ * π .
Proposition C.1 (Local stability of the target for φ π < φ * π ). Consider the dynamics given by (3.5). Let x * denote the solution of the equation 2 + e x − xe x = 0. The following cases are possible:
1. When φ π < φ w π , two values 0 < δ * 1 < δ * 2 exist such that for δ / ∈ [δ * 1 , δ * 2 ] the target steady state is locally stable, and for δ ∈ (δ * 1 , δ * 2 ) the target steady state is unstable.
2. When φ π > φ w π the target steady state is locally stable for any δ ≥ 0.
Proof. The derivative of map f δ described in (C.1) computed in the target steady state is given by
Since we are considering the case in which N > 0, the condition for local stability is given by f δ (0) < 1, or, equivalently by h(δ) < 1 N , where function h is defined as
Notice that h(0) = 0 and the derivative of the function in δ is given by
where we introduced the variable x = δM .
When M > 0, the variable x is positive and changes from 0 to ∞ together with δ.
According to Lemma 1 we have then that the function h is initially increasing in δ and then decreasing. Function h takes its maximum value in the point where x = x * , i.e., when δ = x * /M . The value of function h in this point is given by
The maximum value of h is positive according to Lemma 1. If it is larger than 1 N , i.e., if x * − 1 > M N , then the two solutions of equation h(δ) = 1 N define an interval (δ 1 , δ 2 )
where h(δ) > 1 N , and so the target steady state is unstable. In the opposite case, if the maximum value of h is smaller than 1 N , then h(δ) < 1 N for any δ and the target steady state is always locally stable.
Proposition C.2 (Steady states for δ = +∞). Consider the dynamics given by (3.5)
for the special case of δ = +∞. Let us denote m * = 0, m + = 1 and m − = −1. When the slope of the map is positive, 14 i.e., φ π < φ * π , the following cases are possible:
1. When φ π < φ m π , the system has three locally stable steady states, m * , m + , and m − .
The basin of attraction of the RE steady state is − M N , M N .
2. When φ π > φ m π there exists a unique, globally stable RE steady state.
Proof. For m t−1 > M N we have that M − N m t−1 < 0, therefore f ∞ (m t−1 ) = 1. For
The non-RE steady state m + exists if and only if the 45-degree line has an intersection with the upper horizontal parts of f ∞ , i.e., when it intersects the line 1 at some m > M N . The condition for this to happen is M N < 1, i.e., φ π < φ m π (see Figure 7) .
When the monetary policy is not aggressive enough, i.e., whenever φ π < φ m π , we observe non-fundamental steady states for δ high enough, as suggested by the following Lemma 3. Suppose φ π < φ m π . Then for δ high enough, the map described in (3.5) has two locally stable steady states, m + > 0 and m − = −m + < 0.
Proof. We prove the existence of m + (the existence of m − follows from the symmetry of As δ increases, the RE equilibrium regains its stability at δ = δ * 2 , when function is convex for small m > 0. Thus at δ = δ * 2 a subcritical pitchfork bifurcation occurs and two new unstable steady states appears. But given that f δ (m) is not decreasing and bounded, then there exist two other stable steady states. These five steady states are also observable for high δ values, as proved in Lemma 3.
We have checked the usual conditions for a pitchfork bifurcation to occur. Let m = 0 be a fixed point for the map f δ (m) = F (m, δ), δ * 1,2 the bifurcation values with f δ * 1,2 (0) = 1 and F mm 0, δ * 1,2 = F δ 0, δ * 1,2 = 0 15 Numerical analysis demonstrate that such scenario may happen for values of φ π which are very close to φ w π . See Anufriev, Assenza, Hommes, and Massaro (2013) for details.
The non-degeneracy conditions F m,δ 0, δ * 1,2 = 0 and F mmm 0, δ * 1,2 = 0 hold. Then there is a pitchfork bifurcation at 0, δ * 1,2 . Notice also that at δ = δ * 1 we have F mmm (0, δ * 1 ) < 0, therefore the pitchfork bifurcation is supercritical. On the other hand at δ = δ * 2 , F mmm (0, δ * 2 ) > 0, hence the pitchfork bifurcation is subcritical.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. According to Proposition C.1(2), the target steady state is always locally stable when φ π < φ m π < φ * π . It is unique and, therefore, globally stable, when f δ (m) is concave, i.e., for small δ values (see Lemma 2). On the other hand, when δ is sufficiently high, two other locally stable steady states exist, m + and m − (see Lemma 3). These steady states could only be created via tangent bifurcation. Since we cannot rule out the possibility of a number of subsequent tangent bifurcations (where the non-fundamental steady states are created and subsequently disappear), we denote as δ * 1 the instance of the first tangent bifurcation and as δ * 2 the instance of the last tangent bifurcation. However, in our numerical analysis we never encountered a case in which
Proof of Proposition 3.4 (φ m π < φ π < φ * π ). We will start by proving the global stability result for the case φ m π < φ π < φ * π , i.e., the map f δ (m) is increasing. The proof for the case φ * π < φ π < φ a π is provided below. When φ π > φ m π , it follows from Proposition C.1(2) that the target steady state is locally stable. In order to prove that it is globally stable for any δ, we show that it is the unique steady state of the dynamics described by the map f δ (m). Since f δ (m) is an increasing function, uniqueness implies global stability.
Map f δ (m) can be re-written as
Assume that m > 0. Since function f δ (m) is bounded from above by the horizontal asymptote f δ (m) ≤ 1 ∀m, no steady state can exist within the interval [1, +∞). Let us consider m ∈ (0, 1) and show that f δ (m) ∈ (0, 1 2 ]. Since f δ (m) is an increasing map, the following chain of inequalities holds
Furthermore the aggressive monetary policy scenario, i.e., φ π ≥ φ m π ) implies that M N (φπ) ≥ 1 (see Figure 7) , i.e. M − N (φ π ) ≥ 0. Then from e −δ(N −M ) ≥ 1, we can derive the
The above expression implies that there are no fixed points for m > 1 2 .
Suppose now that 0 < m ≤ 1 2 . Applying the restriction φ π ≥ φ m π , i.e. M −N (φ π ) ≥ 0 we find that the condition on m ∈ (0, 1 2 ] implies that e δ(M/2) < e δ(M −N m) . We obtain the following estimate of dynamics on the interval (0, 1/2)
Let the function on the right hand side be defined as g (m). This function is increasing in m with first and second derivative respectively given by Note that e 2M mδ > 1 and g (m) < 0 for m > 0 and M > 0. Note also that g (0) = 2 M δ e δ(M/2) + 2 and, by fixing M δ = x, we get g (0) = 2x e x/2 + 2
The first derivative of l(x) = 2x e x/2 +2 is l (x) = (2e x/2 −xe x/2 +4) e x +4e x/2 +4 . Therefore a maximum point has to satisfy 2 − x + 4e −x/2 = 0, which is 2x * , with x * defined in Lemma 1. Hence we can state that g (0) < 1.
Thanks to the concavity of g and g (0) < 1 for m > 0, it follows that g (m) < m ∀m > 0.
Given that g (m) borders f (m) then f (m) < m ∀m ∈ (0, 1). Thus no positive fixed points are possible. Since function f δ (m) is odd it also implies that no negative steady states are possible for −1 < m < 0.
Proofs of Propositions 3.4 (φ * π < φ π < φ a π ) -3.6. As we have shown before, when φ π > φ * π the dynamics of m t is described by a decreasing map. Thank to the characteristics of f δ (m) it is possible to prove the dynamical properties of this case employing the same properties of the map when φ π < φ * π .
Indeed it holds that Now, if δ * is a bifurcation value for f δ (m) given the corresponding N ,M , then the same δ * may be a bifurcation value for g δ (m) given the parameter −N ,M . Since we have proved that the target equilibrium has only pitchfork bifurcation for a given N ,M , thus −N ,M corresponds to a flip bifurcation for g δ (m). Furthermore if a tangent bifurcation occurs for N ,M for f δ (m), then a tangent bifurcation will occur at −N ,M for g 2 δ (m) and this gives rise to two 2-cycles for g δ (m).
Thanks to equations (C.4)-(C.5) and to the properties of the map f δ (m), we can prove the results of Propositions 3.4 -3.6 in the way previously adopted.
Moreover, concerning Proposition 3.6, we have checked the usual conditions for a perioddoubling bifurcation to occur. Let m = 0 be a fixed point for the map f δ (m) = F (m, δ), δ * 1,2 the bifurcation values with f δ * 1,2 (0) = −1 and F mm 0, δ * 1,2 = 0 Assume furthermore the non-degeneracy condition F δ F mm + 2F mδ = 0 also holds. Then there is a flip bifurcation at 0, δ * 1,2 . Furthermore at δ = δ * 1 we have that −2F mmm − 3 (F mm ) 2 < 0, therefore the flip bifurcation is supercritical. On the other hand at δ = δ * 2 , −2F mmm − 3 (F mm ) 2 > 0, hence the flip bifurcation is subcritical.
D LTL dynamics
Consider the LTL system described by (3.8). Straightforward computations show that the eigenvalues of the transition matrix are given by λ 1 = 2s 2 δ(k 3 + k 2 σ + (β − 1) 2 σ + k(β − 1)(βφ π − 1)) (k 2 + 2s 2 (k 2 + (β − 1) 2 )δ)(σ + kφ π ) λ 2 = 0 .
The stability analysis reduces to the study of the eigenvalue λ 1 .
Proof of Propositions 3.7. When φ π < 1 we have that λ 1 (0) = 0 λ 1 (δ) = 2k 2 s 2 (k 3 + k 2 σ + (β − 1) 2 σ + k(β − 1)(βφ π − 1)) (k 2 + 2s 2 (k 2 + (β − 1) 2 )δ) 2 (σ + kφ π ) > 0 lim δ→∞ λ 1 (δ) = k 3 + k 2 σ + (β − 1) 2 σ + k(β − 1)(βφ π − 1) (k 2 + (β − 1) 2 )(σ + kφ π ) > 1 , implying that a value δ * must exist such that λ 1 (δ * ) = 1.
When φ π > 1 we have that the following holds:
which imply that target steady state is globally stable for any δ.
When φ π > φ • π we can derive the following restrictions on structural parameters:
When restrictions 1 -2 are satisfied, we can derive the threshold value 1 < φ • π < φ * * π = −k−k 3 +kβ−2σ−2k 2 σ+4βσ−2β 2 σ k+k 3 −3kβ+2kβ 2 such that, when φ π < φ * * π we have that λ 1 (0) = 0 λ 1 (δ) < 0 lim δ→∞ λ 1 (δ) > −1 , implying that the target steady state is globally stable for any δ; while when φ π > φ * * π , we instead have that λ 1 (0) = 0
implying that a value δ * * must exist such that λ 1 (δ * * ) = −1.
When at least one between restrictions 1 -2 is not satisfied we have that λ 1 (0) = 0 λ 1 (δ) < 0 lim δ→∞ λ 1 (δ) > −1 ,
